Military Capabilities of South Asian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern States:

Strategic Endurance and GlobaMilitary Capabilities of South Asian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern States:

Strategic Endurance and Global Confrontation Potential

Author:

Dr. Masood Tariq

Independent Political Theorist

Karachi, Pakistan

drmasoodtariq@gmail.com

Date: June 18, 2025

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the relative military capabilities of 31 countries in South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East using the 2024 Global Firepower Index (GFP) as a foundational metric.

It categorizes the countries into four analytical groups: those capable or incapable of sustaining long-term conventional warfare, and those capable or incapable of confronting global powers such as the United States, China, or Russia.

The analysis is grounded in quantitative rankings and supported by qualitative assessments of military-industrial capacity, defence budgets, nuclear capabilities, regional alliances, and asymmetric warfare strategies.

The study seeks to provide an informed framework for policymakers and scholars examining evolving power balances in Eurasia’s geopolitical core.

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Introduction

Military power in the contemporary world is multidimensional. While traditional parameters such as manpower, firepower, and budget remain relevant, the ability to sustain a long-term conventional war or to deter global superpowers also depends on internal resilience, defence industrial base, logistics, alliances, and access to advanced technologies.

The Global Firepower Index 2024 offers a comparative framework, ranking over 145 countries by evaluating 60+ parameters, including military personnel, equipment, logistics, finances, and geography (Global Firepower, 2024).

This paper evaluates 31 states across three strategic regions: South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, using the GFP Index and additional geopolitical and military indicators. The regions under consideration form a historically contested arc of influence for global powers, particularly in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 global security order.

1. Countries Not Capable of Sustaining Long-Term Conventional War Against Regional Powers

The following countries lack the industrial, economic, or logistical base to conduct or endure long-term conventional warfare against major regional rivals:

(1). Nepal (GFP Rank: 94)

(2). Bhutan (141)

(3). Maldives (151)

(4). Bahrain (119)

(5). Lebanon (118)

(6). Kuwait (78)

(7). Jordan (89)

(. Qatar (77)

(9). Cyprus (110)

(10). Kyrgyzstan (107)

(11). Tajikistan (99)

(12). Turkmenistan (82)

(13). Yemen (74)

(14). Sri Lanka (71)

(15). Palestine (Not ranked)

(16). Afghanistan (Not ranked due to lack of formal military recognition)

These countries face significant constraints in areas such as defence production, force projection, or economic sustainability.

For instance, while Qatar and Bahrain possess modern imported military hardware, their heavy reliance on Western bases and small populations limit independent combat capabilities (Barzegar, 2021).

Many of these states function under a security umbrella provided by external powers, notably the United States or Russia, reflecting a strategic dependency that precludes self-sustained conflict endurance.

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2. Countries Capable of Sustaining Long-Term Regional Warfare

These countries have sufficient strategic depth, manpower, defence budgets, and military doctrines to engage in protracted conflicts with regional adversaries:

(1). India (GFP Rank: 4)

(2). Pakistan (7)

(3). Turkey (

(4). Iran (14)

(5). Egypt (15)

(6). Israel (17)

(7). Saudi Arabia (22)

India and Pakistan maintain large armies, nuclear weapons, and independent defence industries (Kapoor, 2020).

Iran has developed asymmetric warfare capacities and indigenous missile production in response to international sanctions (Cordesman & Toukan, 2014).

Turkey, a NATO member, balances alliance obligations with assertive regional policy, leveraging indigenous drone capabilities (Gündogan, 2022).

Israel, a nuclear-capable state with significant cyber and intelligence assets, maintains qualitative military edge strategies supported by the United States (Riedel, 2017).

These countries exhibit characteristics of strategic autonomy or robust military alliances that enable them to conduct sustained regional operations, especially in contested zones such as the Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Kashmir, and Levant.

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3. Countries Not Capable of Confronting Global Powers (U.S., China, Russia)

The following countries, while maintaining functional armed forces, lack the strategic deterrence or war-making infrastructure to confront global powers:

(1). Bangladesh (Rank: 42)

(2). UAE (54)

(3). Iraq (45)

(4). Syria (64)

(5). Uzbekistan (62)

(6). Kazakhstan (64)

(7). Oman (76)

(. Sudan (73)

All countries listed in Category 1

These countries have moderate military strength but lack comprehensive air defence systems, blue-water navies, advanced cyber capabilities, or nuclear deterrents.

Countries like the UAE and Oman have invested in advanced platforms, yet their dependence on Western training and strategic depth curtails operational independence (Rahman, 2022).

Post-conflict states such as Iraq and Syria are still in reconstruction phases, with fragmented security architectures and heavy foreign influence.

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4. Countries Capable of Facing Global Powers (U.S., China, Russia) in a Conventional or Asymmetric War

This category includes countries that could resist, deter, or confront a global military power either conventionally, asymmetrically, or through nuclear deterrence:

(1). India

Possesses a large-scale military, an active space and cyber program, and a nuclear triad (Tellis, 2017). While not equivalent to the U.S., its capabilities allow regional assertiveness and a limited ability to deter China.

(2). Pakistan

Maintains a credible nuclear deterrent and one of the world’s largest standing armies. It has developed second-strike capabilities and strategic ties with China (Siddiqa, 2007).

(3). Turkey

Leverages NATO membership, domestic arms production, and drone warfare leadership. It demonstrated the capacity to confront Russian and Western actors in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus (Kirişci, 2021).

(4). Iran

While economically sanctioned, Iran has invested heavily in ballistic missile programs, regional militias, and cyber warfare, giving it asymmetric reach (Cordesman & Toukan, 2014).

(5). Israel

It possesses nuclear weapons (undeclared), advanced missile defence (Iron Dome, David’s Sling), and world-class cyber units. Its deterrent doctrine emphasizes pre-emptive strikes and rapid escalation dominance (Riedel, 2017).

These nations may not match global powers in total military capacity but possess the political will, technological expertise, or deterrent mechanisms to wage sustained or asymmetric confrontations. Their strategic behaviours are often shaped by their historical threat perceptions and evolving regional security doctrines.

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5. Conclusion

Military capacity is not merely a function of hardware or numerical strength but a reflection of strategic infrastructure, autonomy, and doctrine.

This paper categorizes the 31 South Asian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern states into clear groupings of military effectiveness.

Only India, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Israel possess the industrial depth and/or deterrent frameworks to engage in prolonged conventional or strategic warfare.

Most others remain dependent on defence imports, foreign bases, or alliances. As global competition intensifies and multipolarity deepens, these regional powers will play increasingly pivotal roles in balancing or resisting the influence of global hegemons.

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6. References

Barzegar, K. (2021). Military Alliances and Persian Gulf Security. Routledge.

Cordesman, A. H., & Toukan, A. (2014). Iran and the Gulf Military Balance. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Global Firepower. (2024). Military Strength Ranking 2024. Retrieved from https://www.globalfirepower.com

Gündogan, A. (2022). Turkey’s Defense Industry Transformation: Between Autonomy and Alliance. Middle East Policy Journal, 29(1), 47–62.

Kapoor, D. (2020). India’s Strategic Military Capabilities: Current Status and Future Outlook. Carnegie India.

Kirişci, K. (2021). Turkey’s Military Engagements: Strategic Autonomy or Regional Aspiration? Brookings Institution.

Rahman, M. (2022). Modernization of Bangladesh Armed Forces: Aspirations vs Capabilities. Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS).

Riedel, B. (2017). Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States Since FDR. Brookings Institution Press.

Siddiqa, A. (2007). Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Pluto Press.

Tellis, A. J. (2017). India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal. RAND Corporation.

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Author Biography

Dr. Masood Tariq is a Karachi-based politician and political theorist. He formerly served as Senior Vice President of the Pakistan Muslim Students Federation (PMSF) Sindh, Councillor of the Municipal Corporation Hyderabad, Advisor to the Chief Minister of Sindh, and Member of the Sindh Cabinet.

His research explores South Asian geopolitics, postcolonial state formation, regional nationalism, and inter-ethnic politics, with a focus on the Punjabi question and Cold War strategic alignments.

He also writes on Pakistan’s socio-political and economic structures, analysing their structural causes and proposing policy-oriented solutions aligned with historical research and contemporary strategy.

His work aims to bridge historical scholarship and strategic analysis to inform policymaking across South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.